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020			_a9780199239948
082			_a126 _bEv23E
100			_aEvnine, S. J. _eAuthor _lEnglish _92303
245		0	_aEpistemic Dimensions of Personhood _c/ by S. J. Evnine. _h[Electronic Resource]
260			_aNew York _b: Oxford University Press, _c2008
520			_aThis book discusses various epistemic aspects of what it is to be a person. Persons are defined as finite beings that have beliefs, including second‐order beliefs about their own and others' beliefs, and engage in agency, including the making of long‐term plans. It is argued that for any being meeting these conditions, a number of epistemic consequences obtain. First, all such beings must have certain logical concepts and be able to use them in certain ways. Secondly, there are at least two principles governing belief that it is rational for persons to satisfy and are such that nothing can be a person at all unless it satisfies them to a large extent. These principles are that one believe the conjunction of one's beliefs and that one treat one's future beliefs as, by and large, better than one's current beliefs. Thirdly, persons both occupy epistemic points of view on the world and show up within those views. This makes it impossible for them to be completely objective about their own beliefs. This 'aspectual dualism' is characteristic of treatments of persons in the Kantian tradition. In sum, these epistemic consequences add up to a fairly traditional view of the nature of persons, one in opposition to much recent theorizing.
650			_aEpistemology _915904
650			_aMetaphysics _915905
650			_aPhilosophy Of Mind _915906
856			_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239948.001.0001 _qPDF _yClick to Access the Online Book
942			_cEBK _nYes
999			_c12409 _d12409